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Abstract
de Bruin et al. (in: Zalta (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, 2018) write that it is 
a philosophically interesting question “whether there is such a thing as an “intrinsic” value of financial assets” noting that 
the calculation of any intrinsic price will depend, in part, on subjective elements. McCauley suggest that there are at least 
five different notions of the ‘true value’ of an asset in finance theory, and argues, consistent with de Bruin et al. that in many 
cases the calculation of such values “makes impossible information demands on our knowledge of future dividends and 
returns” (McCauley (Dynamics of markets-econophysics and finance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004). This 
paper explores some of the subjective elements involved in calculating the intrinsic value of an asset, and their implications 
for the Law of One Price. The Law of One Price states that investors should not pay different prices for the same investment. 
Consequently, the existence, and persistence, of arbitrage opportunities is often attributed to investor irrationality. However, 
if subjectivity is involved in the calculation of intrinsic value then two investors can, rationally, disagree about the value of 
a security. This implies that arbitrage opportunities may not always be instances of irrationality, or genuine mispricing, but 
reflect different investor’s perceptions of the security. In economics, value is taken to be subjective, and Postigo (Axiomathes 
27:591–576, 2017) describes how goods have value because of the role they play in the satisfaction of our needs. By apply-
ing this to finance, this paper will argue that a security can play a number of roles in a portfolio, depending on an investors’ 
strategy. Given these different roles, different investors will be working with different data in their assessment of intrinsic 
value. In order to establish that an arbitrage opportunity exists it is therefore necessary to understand what information is 
relevant to pricing the investment in different locations, or markets. It may, in fact, be the case that the same security can 
trade at different prices because different investors do not see it as the ‘same thing’ at all. This analysis can also be used to 
throw doubt on the emphasis that fundamental analysis receives in discussions of rationality.
Keywords Finance · Information · Arbitrage · Law of One Price · Rationality
1  Information in Financial Markets
The existing literature provides reasons for doubting the idea 
that data, or information, in financial markets is objective, 
or neutral, with respect to the users of this data. For exam-
ple, Ippoliti describes data as “theoretical objects”, arguing 
that there is no such thing as ‘raw data’ in financial markets 
(2017a, p. 180). He writes that data is the output of an inter-
action between models, theories and mechanisms which, he 
argues, is what makes the study of market microstructure 
so fruitfull (Ippoliti 2017b,c). Models and theories about 
financial instruments also sometimes perform markets. The 
idea of performativity in financial markets owes much to 
Mackenzie’s (2008) argument that pricing models of finan-
cial derivatives affected the pricing of these derivatives so 
that they conformed to the models (Although see Brisset 
(2017) and Zuckerman (2013) for critical evaluations of 
performativity). Ippoliti describes the process as one where 
practitioners’ use of certain tools affects markets, and also 
discusses how cognitive biases can affect the use of data 
(2017a, p. 181). Most relevant for this paper is his observa-
tion that a concern with the use of data arises from the need 
to identify what data is relevant to pricing a security. He 
discusses the prediction of recessions, arguing that econo-
mists have a large quantity of data at their disposal, which 
makes it difficult to separate signals from noise. He writes, 
“The possible indicators that seems (sic) to fit past data are 
so many that the underdetermination of hypotheses by data 
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grows exponentially” (2017a, p. 190). He highlights two 
issues; the first is that the data that is relevant changes from 
one economic cycle to another; the second is that because 
data are used to implement policies reflexivity is a problem. 
Deciding which data is relevant is a difficult problem. The 
following section will apply this observation to the pricing 
of financial securities, where a distinction between data and 
information will be proposed.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) postulates that 
the prices of securities traded in financial markets fully 
reflect all available information. There are three versions 
of the EMH- the weak form states that market prices should 
be independent, the semi-strong that prices should reflect 
all public information, and the strong form states that prices 
should reflect all information, including private information. 
If markets do, in fact, fully reflect all available information, 
then it must be clear what ‘information’ is. Greene (2019) 
notes that discussion of the EMH largely takes this as a 
given. In many cases it is apparently obvious what infor-
mation markets should reflect; earnings announcements by 
companies are seemingly uncontrovertially ‘information’ 
for the price of that that company’s equity. However, there 
are reasons for thinking that, as with Ippoliti’s economics 
example, it is often difficult to decide what data is relevant. 
Preda writes that we need to understand “the factors and 
forces which define what constitutes a signal…” (2009, p. 
82). He sees this as part of understanding the community 
of financial practitioners, arguing that what although we 
might understand price data from the nineteenth century as 
signals, we cannot separate what this data means from the 
understanding of financial markets at the time. Similarly, 
what constitutes relevant data “must be constituted through 
the agreement of the community of practitioners.” (2009, p. 
83). In other words, the ‘information’ that markets should 
reflect depends on the practices of the financial community 
making use of this information. Sornette (2002) also sug-
gests that market prices contain information on impending 
crashes, which most traders have not managed to decipher. 
He suggests that the market can show emergent behaviour; 
behaviour at a macro level that is not reducible to micro 
level behaviour. If true, this considerably complicates how 
the idea of ‘information’ is to be understood.
The EMH takes it as given that ‘information’ is incorpo-
rated into market prices, but the discussion above suggests 
that there are two problems with this assumption. Firstly, 
there is a social dimension to information- the information 
relevant to pricing securities depends on the people doing 
this pricing. Secondly, if Sornette is right, there may be 
information in market prices of which most market par-
ticipants are unaware. The literature therefore provides a 
number of reasons for thinking that the determining what 
information is, is not as simple as suggested by the EMH. 
This paper add to this discussion by arguing for a framework 
for distinguishing between data and information.
Greene applies Skyrms’ (2013) analysis of information 
to financial markets to make a distinction between data and 
information. For Skyrms, information is a signal that affects 
the probabilities of the receiver of a signal. His focus was 
on the evolution of sender-receiver games, but his frame-
work can be applied to financial markets, where investors 
are usually concerned with probabilities of security prices 
rising or falling. Applying Skyrms’ framework to financial 
markets suggests that information is data that moves inves-
tors’ probabilities. Skyrms writes that “The informational 
content of a signal consists in how the signal affects prob-
abilities. The quantity of information in a signal is measured 
by how far it moves probabilities.” (Skyrms 2013, p. 34, 
italics in original). Applying this to financial markets; if a 
company releases annual sales data, this is information for 
investors in the company’s equity because it leads them to 
revise their assessment of the probability of the stock price 
rising or falling. Investors have three possible actions they 
can take with regard to a financial investment; they can buy, 
they can sell, or they can do nothing. They have access to a 
wide range of data, some of which may be relevant for their 
investments. Data that leads investors to alter their prob-
abilities about security prices rising or falling is information. 
Investors can therefore be seen as responders to information. 
(Greene 2019, p. 7). Markets contain and produce a lot of 
data, but this only becomes information when it changes 
investors’ probabilities.
2  Framing and Strategies
The previous section introduced the distinction between data 
and information. This section will argue that different inves-
tors may use different data when evaluating the same secu-
rity. The literature on framing illustrates how different inves-
tors can view the same investment in different ways, and how 
this affects their response to new information. Beunza and 
Garud (2007) describe differences in the way Amazon was 
analysed pre-2000; those who framed it as an internet com-
pany, comparing it with Dell, generally had a buy recom-
mendation for the firm. Those who framed it as a bookseller, 
comparing it with Barnes and Noble, had sell or hold rec-
ommendations (2007, pp. 14–15). Beunza and Garud write 
that a Baysian model suggests that analysts should update 
their probability assessments in the same direction when 
new information becomes available. However, the Amazon 
example illustrates that analysts updated their probabilities 
in different directions, and that this is explained by the dif-
ferent frames these analysts used. In April 1999, Amazon 
announced larger losses than expected. For the analyst 
framing Amazon as a bookseller this was evidence that its’ 
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business model wasn’t working. For the analyst who framed 
it as an internet stock these losses weren’t relevant as he 
focussed on future value. They summarise, “The theoreti-
cal lesson here is that in contexts of ambiguity, when dif-
ferent and inconsistent bodies of meaning are available to 
explain the same set of news, analysts accord meaning to 
it with recourse to their existing frame.” (2007, p. 29). In 
other words, different frames can lead analysts to respond 
differently to the same information. Wansleben (2013) sug-
gests that we need to move beyond discussion of framing 
and classification in understanding financial markets, and 
the work of analysts. He suggests that one area for further 
work is hedge funds. While this paper does not deal with the 
specifics of analysts’ work, it provides an additional way in 
which the same investment can be seen in different ways. 
This is illustrated by analysing the role an investment plays 
in hedge fund’s strategies. Greene argues that the same data 
is not information for all investors. She writes,
“Investors pursue many different strategies, and buy 
securities for many different reasons. What counts 
as information for an investor following one strategy 
may not count as information for an investor follow-
ing a different strategy. In other words, an earnings 
announcement may significantly affect one investor’s 
assessment of the probability of a security price rising, 
but leave another investor’s probabilities unchanged. 
To be clear, I am not just saying that both investors 
interpret the significance of the information differently, 
or that they disagree about the importance of the infor-
mation; I am also saying that for one investor it does 
not count as information because it has no informa-
tional content in the sense of Skyrms’ framework: it 
does not move the investor’s assessment of the proba-
bility of the stock price rising.” (Greene 2019, pp. 7–8)
The following example is intended to illustrate her argu-
ment. Suppose there are three types of investor participat-
ing in a market. The first is a fundamental equity investor, 
who analyses fundamental information about companies to 
determine what they should be worth. The second is a macro 
investor who invests in securities on the basis of macro-
economic information, including exchange rates, trends in 
GDP, and political trends. Usually, such an investor will 
invest in a broad range of financial instruments including 
debt, currencies, equities, and derivatives. The third investor 
is an arbitrage investor, who aims to capitalise on changes in 
historical relationships between security prices. This might 
include a disparity between the price of the same company 
listed on different stock exchanges. It could also include tak-
ing advantage of correlations between securities moving out 
of an historic range. These three investors will look at dif-
ferent data- the macro investor has primary interest in data 
on macro-economic trends, the equity investor primarily 
analyses company specific data, while the arbitrage investor 
is more concerned with statistical data. In a very general 
way, these strategies illustrate a different way in which a 
security can be ‘framed’, and the discussion that follows is 
intended to illustrate this.
Let us suppose that each of these investors own the equity 
of Company A, a mining company, and assign the following 
probabilities to the stock price rising over a certain time period:
Macro investor (70% probability that the price will rise 
10% within the next 3 months). This investor owns the equity 
of Company A as part of a trade intended to capitalise on 
rising commodity prices. Company A will benefit from this, 
as will the mining sector as a whole. The Macro investor has 
therefore bought a basket of commodity stocks, including 
Company A. Greene (2019) notes that although it is unusual 
for macro investors to buy equities directly because they 
generally by futures and other derivatives, this assumption 
is not prohibitively restrictive.
Equity investor (60% probability that the price will rise 
10% within the next 3 months). This investor owns the 
equity of Company A because they are optimistic about the 
management’s ability to restructure the company to reduce 
costs. This investor uses bottom up analysis of companies to 
decide which to buy. They therefore hold Company A, but 
no other mining stocks.
Arbitrage investor (75% probability that the price will rise 
10% within the next 3 months). This investor monitors the 
correlation between the prices of equities and takes advan-
tage of changes in these correlations. Company A’s equity 
has, historically, had a 90% correlation with the equity price 
of a company in the same sector. This investor bought the 
equity of Company A on the expectation that the prices of 
these two equities would return to their historic relationship. 
They bought the equity of Company A, and sold short the 
equity of the other company.
Let us then suppose that the following data becomes 
available and assess the difference it makes to the investors’ 
probabilities.
The Rolling Correlation Between Company A and a 
Similar Company in the Same Sector has Moved from 
85% to 75%.
Macro investor: the macro investor is not monitoring 
this data, and may even be entirely unaware of it. This data 
makes no difference to their probability assessment of the 
stock price rising.
Fundamental equity investor: the equity investor also does 
not monitor this data and may even be entirely unaware of it. 
This data makes no difference to their probability assessment 
of the stock price rising.
Arbitrage investor: the expectation of a continuation 
of   the historic high correlation between the two stocks 
motivated their trade. This data is critical for this investor 
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and they revise their probability of the stock price rising 
downwards.
Company A’s Management Team Announce that 
Their Cost Cutting Measures Have Been Successful.
Macro investor: the macro investor will welcome the data, 
but it does not directly affect their motivation for investing 
in Company A. This data has no material effect on their 
probability assessment of the stock price rising because they 
believe the price will be driven by commodity prices.
Fundamental equity investor: the cost cutting scheme 
has a material effect on their valuation model for Company 
A. The equity investor raises their probability of the equity 
price rising.
Arbitrage investor: unless this data changes the relation-
ship between Company A and other equities in the same 
sector this is unlikely to change their probabilities.
This example illustrates that different data is relevant for 
different investors, and, in contrast with the Amazon exam-
ple, that some data is not information at all for some inves-
tors because it fails to change all investors’ probabilities. 
Needless to say, the fully differentiated picture painted above 
is incomplete because the fundamental equity investor is 
likely to incorporate rising commodity prices in their valu-
ation model for the company at some point. Nevertheless, 
forecasting commodity prices, and investing on the basis of 
such forecasts usually falls within the remit of macro inves-
tors, rather than fundamental equity investors.
Differential information has some interesting implica-
tions. Greene discusses the implications this has for the 
EMH, and in particular the problems it poses for tests of the 
EMH. However, the EMH is not the focus of this article. If 
true, the existence of ‘differential information’ also implies 
that the Law of One Price is untrue, unless significant lim-
iting assumptions are made. The remainder of this article 
firstly reviews what arbitrage is, before assessing the impli-
cations of differential information.
3  Explaining Arbitrage
The simplest arbitrage is when a security trades at differ-
ent prices in two places. Buying at the cheaper price and 
selling at the higher price brings these prices together, so 
that the security trades at the same price in both places. 
Billingsley (2006) defines arbitrage as “the process of earn-
ing a riskless profit by taking advantage of different prices 
for the same good” (Understanding Arbitrage, p. 7, italics 
in original). Clearly, the ‘same’ investment should have one 
price. However, what makes two investments the ‘same’? 
Arbitrage theory is used to construct new financial instru-
ments, which are priced on the basis of the prices of their 
constituent parts. Arbitrage theory suggests that an investor 
should pay the same price for the set of underlying invest-
ments as for the security that is constructed using them. 
O’Hara (2016) writes that, “the building blocks of modern 
finance are not securities themselves or particular financial 
contracts, but rather the underlying cash flows that they cre-
ate.” (O’Hara, p. 16). Billingsley puts it slightly differently, 
“the ‘same’ investment must have the same price no mat-
ter how that investment is created” (2006, p. 3). (In 1958, 
Modigliani and Miller argued that a firm’s value is inde-
pendent of its capital structure i.e. the split between debt 
and equity. So, from an investor’s point of view, it does not 
matter whether a firm is financed with debt (and leverage) 
or with equity.) Billingsey calls this the Law of One Price. 
He writes that identical investments can be created using 
different securities. He writes, “These investments must have 
the same expected cashflow payoffs to be considered identi-
cal” (2006, p. 3). In other words, in this case, what makes 
financial instruments the ‘same’ is providing investors with 
the same expected cash flows.
There is an obvious problem with this conception of 
what makes investments the ‘same’. A bank may create a 
derivative that has cash flows identical with another finan-
cial asset. If investors are worried about the financial health 
of the bank they may not pay as much for the derivative 
because they are worried about the ability of the bank to pay 
out these cashflows. So, in addition to the same cashflows 
we need the same risks associated with these cash flows. In 
other words, the ‘same’ assets have the same cash flow and 
risk profile. Billingsley writes “securities are the ‘same’ if 
they produce the same outcomes, which considers both the 
expected returns and risk” (2006, p. 6).
MacKenzie writes that what counts as similar risk is dif-
ficult to judge, and often contentious; “The practice of arbi-
trage can, indeed, be seen as hinging on the identification 
of similarity that is ‘good enough’ for practical purposes” 
(2008, p. 224). He adds that a crucial issue for arbitrage is the 
determination of what counts as ‘sufficient similarity’ (2008, 
p. 271). Hardie and MacKenzie (2013) describe similarity 
judgements as theory dependent. The theories used to evaluate 
an arbitrage opportunity may be mathematical or “vernacular 
and down to earth” (2013, p. 194). They describe both the 
role such theories play in driving similarity judgements, and 
their role in convincing others that an arbitrage opportunity 
exists. In other words, the existence of an arbitrage opportu-
nity is not identified on the basis of objective analysis of inde-
pendent data; it is identified by a community of practitioners 
coming to see different investments as sufficiently similar. To 
summarise, the Law of One Price suggests that ‘the same’ 
investments should trade at the same price. The discussion 
above has illustrated the subjectivity inherent in judgements 
of similarity, or sameness. The following section argues that 
the use of differential information means that investments that 
appear to be the same, may not be the same thing at all.
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4  The Implication of Differential Information 
for Arbitrage, and the Law of One Price
The following section extends the example above to illustrate 
the implication of differential information. Let us suppose 
that the equity of Company A is listed on stock exchanges in 
two different countries; Country 1 and Country 2. Further, 
let us suppose that in Country 1 the equity of Company A 
is primarily held by arbitrage investors, while in Country 2 
the equity of company A is primarily held by fundamental 
equity investors. The equity of Company A trades at dif-
ferent prices in Country 1 and Country 2. What are we to 
make of this?
In this case, the investment- the equity of Company A, is 
the same thing in both places. It represents an equity stake in 
Company A. To make things simple, let us also assume that 
the shares listed in Country 1 are convertible into the shares 
listed in Country 2, and vice versa. A difference in the price 
of these shares therefore represents an arbitrage opportunity-
a security with the same cash flows and the same risk profile 
is trading at different prices. It should be possible to make 
a profit by buying the cheaper equity and selling the more 
expensive equity.
However, things are not necessarily as simple as this. 
Investors in Country 1 primarily hold the equity of Com-
pany A on the expectation that the correlation between the 
equity of Company A and another company in the same 
sector will return to its long-term average. The fundamental 
equity investors in Country 2 hold the equity of Company 
A because it is much cheaper than other companies in the 
same sector, and the management team have announced that 
they will restructure the company to make it more efficient. 
Investors in Country 1 and Country 2 have bought the equity 
of Company A for different reasons, and, if the argument 
above is correct, different data will be information for the 
purposes of their investment strategies. The two types of 
investor hold the equity of Company A to benefit from dif-
ferent factors- a return to a historical statistical relationship 
between two equity prices, or corporate restructuring. The 
bottom up equity investor is very unlikely to sell the equity 
if its correlations with other companies share prices change. 
Similarly, the arbitrage investor is unlikely to sell the equity 
of Company A if the management team announce delays to 
their restructuring plans.
Does an arbitrage opportunity exist in this case? In a 
superficial sense, yes- the same thing is trading at differ-
ent prices. However, if we take differential information into 
account it isn’t clear that the equity of Company A is, in fact, 
the same thing for investors in Country 1 and Country 2. 
This appears counter intuitive. How can the listed equity of 
the same company be a different thing in different locations? 
It is different because the equity has been bought not because 
it represents ownership in Company A, but because it is a 
financial tool that enables investors to profit from different 
factors. Specifically, for the arbitrage investor it is a way to 
profit from a change in equity price correlations, while for 
the fundamental equity investor it is a way to profit from 
developments specific to Company A. An investor seeking 
to capitalise on this arbitrage opportunity may find that the 
pricing differential between the equity of Company A per-
sists because the two types of investor view the investment 
in different ways, and continue to view it differently.
This is a simple example, but not too far removed from 
real life cases. Hershberg (2012) notes that ‘twin stocks’, 
which are “stocks with claims to almost identical dividend 
streams can trade at significantly different prices”. He also 
writes that stocks of parent and subsidiary companies can 
trade at prices that are out of alignment with the relationship 
between these stocks. He discusses the example of Royal 
Dutch and Shell Transport in more detail. These two com-
panies merged on a 60:40 basis in 1907, while remaining 
separate companies. Therefore, shares of Royal Dutch are 
a claim to 60% of the total cash flows, and shares of Shell 
Transport are a claim to 40% of these cash flows. The mar-
ket value of the equity of Royal Dutch should therefore be 
1.5 times the market value of Shell. However, Royal Dutch 
has traded between 35% undervalued and 15% overvalued, 
relative to the price of Shell (2012, p. 17). This paper makes 
no claims about the reasons for this mispricing. The Shell 
example merely demonstrates that the hypothetical example 
is not prohibitively unrealistic because the ‘same’, or very 
similar, security in terms of risk and cash flow profiles can 
trade at different prices for extended periods.
To summarise, if we take the idea of differential infor-
mation in financial market seriously, then this means that 
arbitrage opportunities may not simply be instances of 
mispricing. Where investors use different data as informa-
tion in their strategies they may, rationally, view the ‘same’ 
security differently. Two components of this argument need 
further elaboration. Firstly, the link between irrationality 
and arbitrage, and secondly, the idea that listed equities can 
be viewed differently, depending on an investors’ strategy. 
These are dealt with in turn.
5  Differential Information and Investor 
Rationality
Hershberger cites Thaler and Barberis to highlight one of the 
risks to exploiting arbitrage, which is that “whatever inves-
tor sentiment is causing one share to be undervalued rela-
tive to the other could also cause the share to become even 
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more undervalued in the short term” (Hershberg 2012, p. 
17). Scruggs (2007) attributes the mispricing of Royal Dutch 
and Shell to noise trading. He makes a number of distinc-
tions that are helpful. He defines noise trading as “Trading 
that is uncorrelated with changes in fundamental or intrinsic 
value” and also that noise trading may occur for exogenous 
reasons, such as portfolio rebalancing or liquidity needs, or 
when investors “trade on noise (e.g. sentiment) as if it were 
information” (Scruggs 2007, pp. 76–77). In other words, 
arbitrage opportunities may persist when investors trade on 
sentiment as if it were information, or when they trade on the 
basis of non-fundamental data, such as portfolio rebalancing.
Scruggs assumes that it is clear that sentiment is not 
information. If it is clear what data is information, then trad-
ing on the basis of data that is not information is sentiment, 
or ‘noise trading’. Wu et al. (2017) go further, writing that 
“Investor sentiment is considered to be a belief about future 
cash flows and investment risks that are not justified by the 
facts at hand” (2017, p. 3). However, this is not the only way 
we can interpret this situation. To simplify, we have a model 
of the value of Royal Dutch and Shell, and the value that 
this model gives us changes over time as new information is 
incorporated into the model. However, the share price does 
not always change in line with our model. There are two 
ways in which this can be interpreted; firstly, as evidence 
that investors are trading on noise, or for external reasons, 
secondly, that the model does not incorporate all the infor-
mation investors are using to determine whether to trade. 
The first interpretation privileges fundamental analysis, but, 
as we have seen, not all investors are fundamental investors. 
Scruggs suggests that this is a possibility, he writes, “It is 
unclear whether the unexplained return variation reported in 
these papers is due to noise trading, or whether the empirical 
models do not fully account for all information relevant for 
valuation” (2007, p. 77). Similarly, Rashid (2007) hints that 
‘information’ is a problematic concept. He discusses one 
formulation of the law of one price: As information about 
a commodity improves, its price variability will decline. 
Rashid notes that “Such a reformulation does not necessar-
ily make the new law more testable since the difficulties of 
measuring ‘information’ and its ‘spread’ are at least as great 
as those of measuring the LoP at present” (Rashid 2007, 
p. 81). Unfortunately, Rashid does not elaborate on these 
difficulties.
The persistence of arbitrage opportunities is usually 
attributed to noise trading, but it seems that investors do so 
surprisingly often. Rashid (2007) reviews some examples 
including Lutz (2004) who suggests that deviations from 
the law of one price are observed in the European car mar-
ket, and Haskell and Wolf (2001) who argue that there is 
variability in the price of similar consumer goods in the US. 
Rashid reviews literature discussing similar pricing anoma-
lies in the commodities markets (Rashid 2007, p. 79), and 
concludes with a quote from Williamason and Milner “The 
hypothesis that arbitrage quickly equates goods prices inter-
nationally has probably been rejected more decisively by 
empirical evidence than any other hypothesis in the history 
of economics” (Rashid 2007, p. 80).
What are we to make of this? Sing, in a review of the 
behavioural finance literature begin by noting that traditional 
finance assumes that investors are rational, but that often, 
investors behave emotionally, rather than rationally (2010, 
p. 1). This suggests that irrationality means acting on emo-
tions. Baker and Wurgler (2013)) describe the rationality 
of agents within corporate finance in the following way: 
“Agents are supposed to develop unbiased forecasts about 
future events and use these to make decisions that best serve 
their own interests” (p. 358). Hershberg (2012), citing Thaler 
and Berberis, defines rationality in the following way. An 
agent is rational if, when they “receive new information, 
they update their beliefs correctly, in the manner… consist-
ent with Savage’s notion of Subjective Expected Utility” 
(2012, p. 11). The details of utility theory are beyond the 
scope of this paper however, according to the definitions 
here, investors are rational when they take account of all the 
available information and calculate the risk and expected 
returns of a security in a way that reflects this information. 
The idea of rationality therefore depends on agreement about 
what the relevant information is.
If we want to show that an investor is irrational, then we 
must firstly agree about what the relevant information is that 
they should be taking account of. As the example above has 
sought to demonstrate, this is not always as easy as it seems, 
because it depends on why an investor has invested in a secu-
rity. Behavioural finance has discovered a number of ways 
in which investors are not rational (The Handbook of the 
Economic of Finance has a good overview of the literature 
in Chapter 22), but this, again, is not the focus of this paper. 
The focus here is on the difficulty in deciding what it means 
for an investor to be rational. If investors make use of differ-
ential information, then two investors can, rationally, differ 
in their belief about what information is relevant to deciding 
whether to buy or sell a security. Zuckerman (2004) argues 
for a similar point of view. He notes that stocks are evalu-
ated by reference to industry classifications, but that stocks 
vary in how neatly they fit into a classification. Some stocks 
are therefore classified, and analysed, heterogeneously. He 
writes, “the arrival of material information should stimulate 
more trade when the stock is incoherent because investors 
in such stocks are more likely to vary in the models they 
use to interpret such news” (2004, p. 413). In other words, 
when stocks are viewed heterogeneously analysts will inter-
pret new information differently. This paper argues that the 
heterogeneity extends beyond classification, and that when 
stocks play a different role in investor’s strategies they can 
disagree about what the relevant information is.
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A caveat is required here. Two investors using the same 
information to decide what an investment is worth may also 
disagree about the value of a security. This can be for any 
number of reasons, including disagreements about the sig-
nificance of information. The point argued for here is that 
disagreements about information extend beyond disagree-
ment about the significance of a specific piece of informa-
tion. Different investors may be looking at entirely different 
information. In order to judge whether an investor is rational 
we must firstly be clear what data they consider information. 
This is not to say that fundamental data is entirely irrelevant 
because if company performed so poorly that it goes into 
bankruptcy this would significantly impact the correlation 
between its’ share price and the share prices of other com-
panies. In the normal course of events however, fundamental 
data is not something that the arbitrage investor need con-
cern themselves with.
It might be responded that, indeed, any trading strategy 
that does not focus on fundamental information is irrational. 
However, strategies not based on fundamental analysis are 
profitable, so it is difficult to countenance the view that 
investors pursuing these strategies are irrational, except 
in a very limited sense in which ‘rationality’ is defined by 
reference to fundamental information. Furthermore, there 
is evidence that the noise trading effect varies over time. 
Scruggs writes that the effect of noise trading was high fol-
lowing the failure of LTCM in 1998 and and peaked during 
the collapse of the tech bubble in 2000 (Scruggs 2007, p. 
80). This suggests, although it requires further empirical 
investigation, that data about shocks to the financial system 
(in the case of the LTCM), or dramatic market dislocation 
(in the case of the collapse of the tech bubble) becomes 
information for a large number of investors who, in more 
benign times concentrated on fundamental, or other, data. 
In effect, their usual information is swamped by informa-
tion about such shocks. A simple example might illustrate 
what is going on. For a short period after a large natural 
disaster the only data that is information is about the extent 
of the disaster. It may take some time for investors to turn 
their attention to any other data. If fundamental data is all 
that matters, this is irrational to the extent that the disaster 
does not affect the fundamental performance of a company. 
However, given extreme uncertainty, the only data that is 
information is data about the disaster.
One worry with widening the notion of rationality in 
financial markets is that it appears to countenance any data 
as information, as long as some investors are using it. There 
may be investors using astrology, or those infamous mon-
keys with darts, to inform their investment strategy. Does 
this mean we are committed to accepting these investors as 
rational? We need to distinguish between the rationality of 
an investors’ strategy, and the rationality of their respon-
siveness to information. An investor using an investment 
strategy based on dart throwing monkeys will be rationally 
responding to data, if they incorporate all the data that is rel-
evant to their strategy. This does not mean that their strategy 
itself is rational. However, if an investor generates consistent 
returns using a monkey-based strategy, then I see no particu-
lar worry with accepting that this strategy is rational, with 
the caveat that the reason for its success is a mystery. Per-
haps those monkeys know more than we give them credit for.
In conclusion, the traditional view of financial markets 
contrasts fundamental trading with noise trading, with the 
implication that deviations from fundamental value are a 
failure to respond to relevant information. This privileges 
fundamental analysis and its importance for valuation and 
capital markets. This rationality by fiat strategy is unjustified 
because different types of investors may be using other data 
as information for the purposes of their strategy. However, 
a caveat is required here; investors may agree about what 
fundamental data is relevant to determining the fundamental 
value of a security, but disagree about whether this is infor-
mation for the purposes of trading in a security. Specifically, 
the arbitrage investor may, if asked, agree with the funda-
mental equity investor about what information is required 
to calculate the fundamental value of the company but this 
does not mean that this is information for the purposes of 
trading the equity of that company. The following section 
reviews the idea of subjective value in economics with the 
aim of clarifying this distinction.
6  Subjective Value and Economics
In economics, it is widely accepted that value is subjective, 
but it is not always clear what economists mean by this. Pos-
tigo (2017) writes, “All economists today accept that value 
is subjective.” (2017, p. 562). The standard interpretation is 
that economic value measures how much someone is will-
ing to pay for a good. This willingness to pay is determined 
by the goods that must be forgone to make this purchase. 
Postigo’s concern is that this describes a process of valuing 
by an agent, but does not illuminate what has value to this 
agent, namely the good they decide to buy.
Eabrasu writes that “the meaning of subjective value 
remains equivocal and imprecise.” (2011, p. 216). She 
begins with a definition of subjectivity. Choice is made in 
an environment of scarcity; but scarcity, in and of itself, 
does not tell us whether value is subjective. It simply tells 
us that choices must be made. Value is subjective if “we 
admit that the values are the outcome of the preferences 
effectively demonstrated in the course of their actions. Con-
versely, the theory of value is objective if we consider that 
the values of the ends to be pursued by the agent are ordered 
independently of their effective preferences.” (2011, p. 219). 
Postigo understands subjective value in a similar way. He 
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reviews the origins of subjective value theory, proposed by 
Menger, as an alternative to the view that the value of a good 
is determined by the costs the costs of producing it. Menger 
proposed that value “is the importance that individual goods 
or quantities of goods attain because we perceive these as 
the causal factors to the satisfaction of our needs in concrete 
choices.” (Postigo 2017, p. 563). This notion of value has 
two components, the opportunity cost of choices foregone, 
and the role the goods under consideration play in the satis-
faction of our needs. Postigo calls this the “intentional con-
tent” of a choice which “is shaped by the particular present 
need for which each alternative is evaluated.” (2017, pp. 
565–566). This choice results in a good having value.
However, Postigo notes that, in modern economics text-
books, value is not understood in this way, despite it being 
described as subjective. Value is calculated on the basis of a 
comparative calculation of costs versus benefits for the alter-
natives under consideration (p. 567). “All value is expressed 
according to rational choice theory, and there is no need for 
a theory of value” (p. 568). Ebarasu makes this distinction 
more explicit. Neoclassical economists usually agree that 
subjective value theory is underpinned by subjective pref-
erences. However, in the Austrian conception, value only 
emerges through intentional action; value is tied to pref-
erences that are demonstrated through real choices. This 
means that “prices emerge only after the effective action of 
buying and selling. Objectivists maintain that the price can 
be determined independently of the real action, by looking at 
the costs of production, the intrinsic utility of the exchanged 
good, the imagined individual preferences, etc.” (p. 221).
This discussion has an interesting implication for financial 
markets. If we countenance the role intentional action has in 
determining the value of a good, in other words, that goods 
have value for agents because of the role they play in the satis-
faction of their needs, then this provides an underpinning for 
a theory of subjective value in financial markets. Securities 
have value for investors due to the role they play in their dif-
ferent investment strategies. These strategies dictate what data 
is information for an investor pursuing these strategies. If true, 
this means that assets with identical cash flows may indeed be 
different things for investors using different strategies. Inves-
tors believe those cash flows, and the risks associated with 
these cash flows, to be contingent on different factors. The 
arbitrage investor buys the equity of Company A because it 
provides exposure to changing correlations between it and 
other equities. The fundamental equity investor buys the equity 
of Company A because of changes in the fundamental features 
of the underlying company. While both investors may believe 
that the price of Company A will rise, they believe this rise is 
contingent on different factors. For the arbitrage investor it is 
a return to an average level of correlation between Company 
A and other stocks, for the fundamental equity investor it is 
the restructuring of the company and the risks they associate 
with these returns are entirely different.
This characterisation may seem counterintuitive given that 
although economic goods can satisfy a range of needs, the 
equity of a company is just a financial interest in that company, 
and the performance of that underlying company depends on 
the fundamentals of that company. While it is true that the 
equity of a company does represent the right to cash flows 
from that company, when it is listed on an exchange it also 
becomes a financial instrument that can play a number of roles, 
or satisfy a variety of needs, within an investment strategy. 
Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that the very notion 
of the ‘fundamental value’ of an equity reflects investors 
beliefs about equity markets, rather than an objective calcula-
tion of value. This is because the way the fundamental value 
of equities has been calculated has changed significantly over 
time. Rutterford (2004) reviews the changes to equity valuation 
models in the US and UK and concludes that “once accounting 
and taxation difficulties have been dealt with, it is market levels 
which are a primary influence on the popularity of particular 
valuation techniques (2004, p. 143). Although fundamental 
analysis appears to provide an objective value for an equity, the 
valuation methodologies have changed significantly over time. 
If Rutterford is correct, this is not due to increasing accuracy, 
but a response to market levels.
7  Conclusion
De Bruin and Walter (2017) note that, despite evidence 
that many of the assumptions made by traditional finance 
are questionable, they continue to be used in theory, and 
by practitioners. The examples they discuss include the 
assumption of normality of market returns, and the ten-
dency of volatility to cluster (large moves are more likely 
to follow other large moves, and vice versa). This paper 
has sought to question the assumptions underpinning the 
Law of One Price, by arguing that it rests on a simplistic 
understanding of information in financial markets. Build-
ing on the idea of ‘frames’, it argued that the same security 
can be seen as different things, depending on the role it 
plays in an investor’s strategy. If true, this has a number 
of implications for the standard understanding of financial 
markets:
First, that when a security plays different roles in invest-
ment strategies, or portfolios, different data is information 
for evaluating this security.
Second, that if investors use different data to determine 
whether to buy or sell a security they may be willing to pay 
different prices for this security.
Third, that the persistence of arbitrage opportunities may 
therefore not be instances of irrationality, or the effects of 
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‘noise’ trading, but reflect the use of differential information 
by investors.
Fourth, that the law of one price is therefore only a law 
if all investors are using the same information to decide 
whether to buy or sell a security.
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